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ABSTRACT: Because of the falling oil revenues throughout the 80' s, Saudi Arabia, as most 
of the OPEC countries, was forced to introduce fiscal austerity programs. However, little is 
known about the criteria followed in setting expenditure priorities, particularly with reference 
to the transportation and communication sector. The paper deals with issues such as: how the 
Saudi Arabian authorities revised their allocations to the major budgetary categories following 
revenue developments during the fiscal year; the topic of supposed systematical unanticipated 
changes in revenues; the related issue of which categories gained or lost; and finally the possible 
insights as to the strategy followed by the government in setting budgetary priorities. 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the 1980s Saudi Arabia, experienced a period of relative fiscal 
austerity. Falling oil revenues forced a number of significant budgetary 
cutbacks. However, by early 1989 the situation had stabilized to the point that 
the Saudi Arabian government announced that its 1989 budget would be equal 
to that of 1987-SR 140 million. To many observers, this signaled a welcome 
end to the deflationary effects of successive reductions in government budgetary 
expenditures over the last few years. In practice, it allowed ministries to 
prepare sufficient projects for implementation in the event that revenue 
constraints did not force cutbacks during the year (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1989). 
*)Final version: March 1991. 
(**)Robert E. Looney is a Professor, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, Ca. 
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While most of the OPEC countries were forced to introduce similar 
austerity programs, little is known about how these governments set priorities 
for their shrinking revenues between major expenditure categories, and in 
particular the transportation and communications sector. The purpose of this 
paper is to address this issue. In particular, we are interested in determining the 
manner in which the Saudi government revised, in light of revenue developments 
during the fiscal year, its allocation to the major budgetary categories. Did 
expenditures on certain categories vary systematically with unanticipated 
changes in revenues? If so, which sectors gained? Lost? Do these patterns 
provide insights as to the manner in which the government established 
budgetary priorities during this period? 
COMPOSITION OF THE BUDGET 
As noted above relatively little is known about how OPEC governments 
make expenditure decisions as to what programs to cut back during periods of 
austerity. For the non-OPEC countries, anectdotal evidence suggest that 
officials follow rather ad hoc rules from making large contractions in a short 
period of time-cutting new rather than on-going projects, new rather than 
present employment, materials and travel expenses rather than personnel, and 
favoring ministries that are politically powerful or reducing those that have 
expanded most rapidly in the past (1). Some sectors are often thought to be 
more vulnerable than others to reductions; social sectors in particular are 
usually considered more and defense sectors less prone to budgetary cuts. 
As to the choice of which sectors to cut back, it is often felt that some sectors 
are more "vulnerable"than others to reductions. The defense sector, particularly, 
is usually considered difficult to reduce, while other sectors, particularly the 
social sectors such as health, education and rural development are considered 
vulnerable. The alleged vulnerability of the social sectors in non-OPEC 
countries is clearly evident in World Bank documents: 
In the difficult past few years, budgetary crises have often meant that 
social services were cut back, in the process unraveling carefully 
designed programs. (The World Bank, 1983 (b)). 
(1) Cfr. the discussion. in N. Caiden and A. Wildavsky, 1974 . 
• 
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Since many human development programs are publicly funded, they are 
especially vulnerable when growth is threatened and budgets are under 
pressure. The recurrent costs of social programs, especially salary costs, 
tended to make them a permanent and, therefore, vulnerable part of 
government budgets (The World Bank; 1981). 
Quick fix relief through disproportionate cutbacks-in, for example, 
education or rural development-may well have negative consequences 
for the entire economy (The World Bank, 1983 (a)). 
Many member countries have had to reduce and reorient investment 
programs to curtail recurrent expenditures and to delay the completion 
of high priority development projects. Programs in health, education 
and other social sectors have been particularly vulnerable (The World 
Bank, 1984). 
In the crisis situations confronting African governments, education, 
training and health programs are continuously in danger of becoming 
the residual legatees of both resources and of attention by policy makers 
(The World Bank, 1983 (c)). 
Despite these rather strongly held views, little empirical investigation has 
been made concerning the budgetary vulnerability of individual sectors. In the 
most comprehensive study to date Hicks and Kubisch (1984) examined 37 
cases of budgetary reductions. These were defined as occurring in countries 
where real expenditures declined in one or more years. According to Hicks and 
Kubisch, a sector was defined as: 
1. Well protected if expenditures on it were reduced by less than the 
percentage reduction in total expenditures . 
2. Vulnerable if its percentage of reduction exceeded the average. 
In brief, a simple ratio of percentage changes in each sector's expenditures 
relative to total spending served as the measure of vulnerability. Where the 
ratio had a greater value than one, it indicated that the sector was highly 
vulnerable; a value between zero and one indicated low vulnerability, with less 
than proportional reductions in the relevant sector. A negative value indicated 
that despite overall expenditure reductions, the sector was allowed to expand. 
Hicks and Kubisch main findings (Table 1) indicated that the countries 
examined experienced an average decline of 13% in real government 
• 
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expenditures. Associated with this decline was a contraction of only 5 % in the 
social sectors (producing a vulnerability index of 0.4). By contrast, the index 
was 0.6 for administrative/defense sectors and over 1 percent for production 
and infrastructure. In short, the various social sectors were less vulnerable to 
cuts than defense and administration which in tum were considerably less 
vulnerable than production and infrastructure, contrary to the generally accepted 
view. 
The fact that social sectors and defense were both relatively protected 
suggests that there were high political costs associated with reducing them. On 
the other hand, countries appeared to have been more willing to cut spending 
TABLE 1 
Impact of Reduction in Government Expenditures 
Expenditures Category 
Social Defense/ Production Infrastructure Miscell. 
Admin 




Index of 0.4 0.6 1.2 1.7 0.8 
Vulner-
ability 
Low 0.2 0.9 0.6 1.2 0.5 
Income 
Middle 0.5 0.4 1.7 1.9 1.1 
Income 
Source: Norman Hicks and Anne Kubisch, "Cutting Government Expenditures in LDCs "Finance 
and Development (September 1984), p. 38. 
Note: Capital and recurring expenditures for 32 developing countries for various periods during 
1972-80. 
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on infrastructure and production. The net result of which had adverse 
implications for longer-term growth prospects but fewer early, direct and 
immediate political costs. 
These conditions were not very differentfor countries belonging to different 
income groups. The low income countries (Table 1) appear to have afforded 
slightly more protection to the social sectors and production and slightly less 
to administration and defense, but the difference was marginal. The middle 
income countries, by contrast, gave more protection to administration and 
defense and less to productive and infrastructural sectors. 
The apparent bias toward maintaining expenditures in the social services 
and defense may reflect the government's preference for present consumption 
over investment and future consumption, since social sectors and defense 
typically have a heavy bias toward recurrent expenditures and within these 
there is a sizable employment component. Since the social sectors and defense/ 
administration are relatively labor intensive with high recurrent costs, reducing 
expenditures on them not only cuts back services highly valued by the public, 
but also causes relatively high unemployment per unit reduction. 
The manner in which government deals with austerity seems to hold up 
fairly well for the Saudi Arabian case. In recent years, there has been a general 
shift from public investment towards public consumption (Table 2). Within 
this fiscal environment, all the major categories of the budget have been cut 
(Table 3). Infrastructure spending in particular has been cut drastically, with 
few new projects commissioned. The budget for education and health has also 
been cut, reflecting in part a decline in.capital expenditure on new schools and 
hospitals. The wage bill for teachers, nurses and doctors continues to rise, 
however. Similar conditions arise with defense expenditures; even though as 
basic defense infrastructure is past its peak, the need to purchase new 
equipment and to maintain existing systems is still great (Wilson, 1987). 
In terms of specific allocations (Table 3): 
1. Government lending institutions have experienced the greatest reduction 
in their allocations, declining by 51.9 percent over the 1983/88 period, and with 
cutbacks accelerating to 67.5 percent for the more recent 1985/88 period. 
2. After expanding at an average rate of 20.6 percent over the period 
following the second oil price increase (1980-82), humanresourcedevelopment 
averaged reductions of 5.8 and 8.0 percent per annum over the 1983-88 and 
. 
TABLE2 1~ 
Saudi Arabia: Public/Private Sector Expenditure Patterns, 1979-1988 
(Percentages) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
(Percentage of Gross Domestic Product) 
Public 48.4 27.5 37.2 48.3 50.5 47.7 46.8 48.5 49.0 42.6 
Expenditures 
Public 28.8 15.7 24.5 30.5 32.6 34.5 36.4 39.2 39.1 32.7 
Consumption 
Public 19.6 11.8 12.7 17.8 17.9 13.2 10.4 9.3 9.9 9.9 !li::I 
Investment ~ 
Private 35.3 26.5 29.6 45.1 51.5 56.9 61.7 63.5 60.0 59.0 I Expenditures 
Private 27.5 22.1 24.1 36.4 42.3 45.3 50.5 51.7 49.2 49.1 
Consumption 
Private 7.8 4.5 5.5 8.6 9.2 11.6 11.2 11.8 10.8 9.9 
Investment 
Source: Computed from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. Note: Government expenditures for 1987 are 
given as 137, 422. 
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1985-88 period respectively. It appears, however, that of the major budgetary 
categories, human resource development experienced the smallest cutbacks 
during the 1983/88 period, and over the 1985/88 period. 
3.Despitethecommonperceptionoftheirhighpriority,defenseexpenditures 
TABLE3 
Saudi Arabia: Central Government Budgetary Expenditures: 1980-88 
(Billions of Saudi Riyals) 
Average Annual 
Rate of Growth 
1980/ 1983/ 1985/ 
Category 1980 1983 1985 1988 1983 1985 1988 
Human Resource 18.2 31.9 30.4 23.7 20.6 -5.8 -8.0 
Development 
Transportation & 24.4 32.5 22.2 10.9 10.0 -6.1 -21.1 
Communications 
Economic 14.9 22.0 12.5 5.9 13.9 -23.1 -22.1 
Resource Dev 
Health 9.8 17.0 16.1 10.8 20.2 -8.7 -28.5 
Infrastructure 6.9 11.7 9.8 3.6 19.3 -21.0 -28.4 
Municipal 12.7 26.2 17.1 7.0 27.3 -23.3 -25.7 
Services 
Defense 56.5 92.9 79.9 50.1 18.0 -11.6 -14.4 
Pub Administ. 48.0 44.6 43.9 25.1 -2.4 -10.9 -17.0 
Govt Lending 24.8 23.4 17.5 0.6 -1.9 -51.9 -67.5 
Institutions 
Local Subsidies 0.0 11.2 10.5 5.3 -13.9 -20.4 
Notes: Based on data from: Saudi Arabian Monetary.Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
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contracted at the fairly rapid rate of 11.6 and 14.4 percent per annum over the 
1983/88 and 1985/88 periods. 
4. The same also applies to local subsidies which have declined at 13.9 and 
20.4 percent per annum during the 1983/88 and 1985/88 periods respectively. 
As a result of these differential rates of contraction, the relative shares of the 
major expenditure items have undergone a fairly large realignment (Table 4). 
TABLE4 
Saudi Arabia: Composition of Central Government Budget 1980-88 
(Percent of Central Government Expenditures) 
Category 1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Human Resource 8.5 8.8 10.7 11.7 12.3 14.8 16.6 
Development 
Transportation 11.3 11.9 9.6 8.5 7.2 6.8 6.7 
Communications 
Economic 6.9 7.6 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.1 4.2 
Resource Dev 
I 
Health 4.6 4.6 5.2 6.2 6.4 7.0 7.7 
Infrastructure 3.1 4.7' 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.7 2.5 
Municipal 5.9 8.8 7.3 6.6 5.9 5.1 5.0 
Services 
Defense 26.1 27.7 29.0 30.7 32.0 34.0 35.5 
PubAdmin. 22.2 14.4 18.2 16.9 19.8 19.4 17.8 
Govt Lending 11.5 8.3 7.7 6.7 4.7 2.2 0.4 
Institutions 
Local Subsidies 0.0 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.2 3.9 3.8 
Notes: Based on data from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, various issues. 
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1. There has been a major increase in human resource development, from 
8.5 percent of government expenditures in 1980to 16.6percentin 1988. Again 
this increase reflects more the contraction of human resource expenditures at 
a rate considerably less than ~perienced by other major categories. 
2. Defense expenditures have maintained their dominant position increasing 
from around twenty-six percent of the budget in 1980 to over thirty-five 
percent by 1988. 
3. Government lending institutions have experienced a dramatic decline in 
importance, experiencing a decline in their share of government expenditure. 
This fell from over 11 percent (1980) to less than a half percent (1988). 
4. Infrastructure expenditures in 1988 were about one half their 1980 share. 
5. A similar percentage decline was experienced by transportation and 
communications. 
Human resource expenditures have enabled the country to achieve significant 
increases in both enrollment rates and teacher student ratios. Although the 
country lags somewhat behind comparable countries in terms of enrollment 
rates, it appears to be closing the gap fairly quickly. In addition, the pupil 
teacher ratio is one of the lowest ones in the region. 
On the other hand, the relatively low number of pupils reaching the sixth 
grade (The World Bank, 1989) indicates that a number of difficulties exist in 
terms of perhaps the quality of education received. It is clear that the country 
has made some great strides in its efforts to increase the kingdom's stock of 
human capital. However, it is just as apparent that a great deal more needs to 
be accomplished. 
OPERA TI ON AL DEFINITIONS 
The evolving budgetary patterns examined above are suggestive of the 
manner in which the Saudi Government sets priorities for its expenditure. 
However, simple comparisons in the relative growth of budgetary allocation 
to individual sectors (or their share of the total) while suggestive, are not 
sufficient in and of themselves to infer the existence of any particular pattern 
of budgetary priorities. These measures fail to capture the dynamics of the 
budgetary process. 
While the government's fiscal position provides an insight into the public 
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sector's budgetary priorities, a more sensitive and indicative indicator is the 
manner in which the government uses the deficits (Table 5) to fund or reduce 
allocation to certain budgetary categories. Three types of deficits are relevant: 
(a) Actual Deficits- those that actually occur during the budget period. 
Here deficits are defined as the difference between government expenditure 
and government revenues (2). 
(b) Expected Deficits-those anticipated at the beginning of the fiscal year 
i.e. the difference between anticipated expenditures and forecasted revenues. 
( c) U nexpectedDeficits-changes in the public sector's budgetary position, 
defined as the difference between the actual deficit in any year and the one that 
was expected to occur at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Here we assume that expected deficit reflects a structural imbalance 
between revenues and expenditures. Similarly, transitory government deficits 
are assumed to be depicted by that component of the public deficit that was 
unexpected. Clearly, the basic assumption underlying these proxies is that the 
expected deficit represents an on - going budgetary process that moves slowly 
over time and cannot be changed very rapidly. 
Given the aversion of the Government to run deficits (Looney, 1990), the 
relationship between a sector's budgetary share and the government's fiscal 
position (revenues minus expenditures) in any year should be indicative of the 
priority accorded that sector. More specifically, the Government is willing to 
run deficits only for the purpose of funding high priority expenditures. The 
shares of these budgetary categories would therefore be expected to increase 
during periods of growing budgetary deficits. Similarly, their budgetary shares 
should decrease during periods of growing budgetary surplus-that is during 
times when the government has ample funds to allocate to lower priority 
activities. 
Incorporating these elements into a model of budgetary priorities (with 
expected signs for high priority categories in parenthesis) yields: 
(2) This definiton of the deficit makes it easier to interpret the empirical results presented 
in Tables A-1 throughA-5. That is since an increase in thedeficithas apositvesign, we can easily 
determine which budgetary categories owe their increased budgetary share to the governments 
willingnesss to run a higher deficit. Likewise we can determine which budgetary categories are 
vulnerable to cutbacks associated with a growing fiscal deficit. 
TABLES 
Saudi Arabia: Budgetary, 1979-1988 
(Percentages) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
(Percentages of Gross Domestic Product) 
Expected 0.0 4.4 21.3 10.1 0.0 10.0 14.7 0.0 19.1 12.7 
Deficit 
Actual 6.6 -4.9 -21.3 -20.7 -0.3 6.8 14.3 18.6 32.1 24.7 
Deficit 
I.Jnanticipated 6.6 -8.8 -42.5 -30.2 -0.3 -3.2 -0.4 18.6 13.0 12.0 
Deficit 
Source: Computed from: Saudi Arabian Monetary Annual Report, various issues. Notes: Government expenditures for 1987 are given 
as 137,422 million riyals for the first ten months of the year. This figure was proportioned up to 164,906 million riyals for a twelve month 
period. The same was done for revenues. The deficit is computed as expenditures minus revenues. Therefore a positive figure indicates 
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DEFU = the unexpected budgetary deficit 
DEF A = the actual budgetary deficit 
DEFB = the expected budgetary deficit 





In terms of indices of budgetary priorities, we hypothesize that the 
unanticipated deficit should be the most indicative measure of the priority 
afforded a budgetary category. During the fiscal year additional (emergency) 
borrowing would likely only be used to assure adequate funding of the 
government's most important programs. The actual deficit is less volatile, and 
therefore would be next in importance as an indicatorof priority. The expected 
deficit provides an initial benchmark measure of budgetary priorities. 
This form of prioritizing is consistent with (although not proof of) some 
form of lexicographic (Encarnacion, 1970) ordering of budgetary priorities. 
That is the government tries to maintain certain budgetary categories at pre-
defined levels. When these levels are met, the authorities are then willing to 
provide additional funding for categories and programs of lower priority. 
The expected level of government expenditures was entered as a control 
variable. That is as the share of government expenditures in GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) increase, do certain budgetary categories tend to 
systematically have their budgetary shares increase. This is the so called 
Wagner's Law (3) effect whereby countries allocate a higher proportion of 
their resources to certain public goods (usually defense) with the general 
expansion of the government in the economy. 
(3) For a description of this effect together with empirical evidence see Robert E. Looney, 
Third World Military Expenditure and Arms Production (London: Macmillan, 1988), chapter 5. 
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' 
RESULTS 
Because of the limited number of observations, the available degrees of 
freedom did not permit the estimation of the full model described in Equation 
A above. Instead, a series of regressions were. estimated utilizing sets of two 
of the independent variables. This method had the advantage of testing for the 
consistency and robustness of results-Le. were the independent variables 
statistically significant across a number of alternative specifications? 
The main results are presented in Tables A-1 through A-5 and summarized 
in Table 6. They provide a number of important insights concerning Saudi 
Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Budgetary Impact ( 1979-1988) 
Summary of Main Findings by Budgetary Category 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Budgetary 
Category Fiscal Measure 
Unexpected Expected Actual 
Deficit Deficit Deficit 
Transportation and ins 
Communications 
Infrastructure ins 
Economic Service ins 
Human Resource Development + ins + 
Health and Social Development ins ' + + 
Municipal Services ins ins ins 
Defense ins ins ins 
Government Lending ins 
Administration ins ins ins 














Note: Based on Tables A-1 through A-5. +=positive and consistently statistically significant 
at the 95 percent level; - =negative and consistently statistically significant at the 95 percent 
level; ins = insignificant at the 95 percent level. 
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Arabian budgetary priorities and, in particular the effect of budgetary shortfalls 
on allocations to transportation and communications: 
1. As anticipated transportation and communications suffered (along with 
infrastructure and economic services) major cutbacks during periods of 
unexpected increases in the government deficit. These sectors were also 
quite vulnerable to reductions when the actual deficit increased. 
2. Further evidence that these sectors had a low priority during the 1980s 
stems from the fact that their expansion was largely a function of increases 
in expected revenues. That is only after other budgetary categories received 
funding from the deficits, were these budgetary categories funded due to 
rising expectations concerning oil revenues. 
3. Human resource development and health and social development were 
the only budgetary categories to have their budgetary shares increase with 
expanded unanticipated deficits. They were also the only sectors to have 
their budgetary shares increase during periods ofincreased actual (realized) 
budgetary deficits. 
4. Human resource development and health did not have their budgetary 
shares expanded with increases in expected revenues. This finding is 
consistent with the notion that because of their high priority their funding 
levels were assured. Given this marginal increases in revenues could be 
safely used by the authorities to fund lower priority projects. 
5. The deficit-related expansion in human capital seems to have come in 
part at the expense of longer term investments in economic capacity. 
Specifically: (a) transportation and communications, (b) economic services 
and ( c) infrastructure all had their budgetary shares contract during periods 
of increased unexpected and actual deficits. This finding is consistent with 
the findings of Hicks and Kubisch noted above. 
In general the main findings confirm the unwillingness of the Saudi 
govenment to fund longer term projects during periods of budgetary austerity. 
Instead, on-going projects in the social area were relatively protected during 
the period of austerity and budgetary contraction in the 1980s. 
'.-,:.:\~.:: . ·-
·:-.1:· .... ,,.}-o;, ;·~ ... -
Public investment in transport: A test of the Hichks-Kubisch thesis for Saudi Arabia 37 
CONCLUSIONS 
As a result of the Gulf War, together with increasing worries concerning 
internal security, one might correctly assume that defense spending would 
have been a higher priority than ever before in Saudi Arabia. While defense has 
retained its leading share of the budget during the recent period of relative 
fiscal austerity, the country does not appear to have fallen into the guns versus 
education syndrome. In fact the two types of expenditure appearto complement 
each other in the minds of the Saudi budgetary authorities. 
While the country appears finnly committed to its responsibility of providing 
educational opportunities to the majority of its citizens, there is reason for 
concern. The relative neglect of the transport/communication sector (along 
with economic services and infrastructure) mean that there will be a general 
erosion of the productivity of Saudi graduates unless the government addresses 
the country's growing imbalance between physical and human capital. 
Fortunately, the results above suggest that the government's recently improved 
revenue position will be used to expand investment in the nation's transport 
system. 
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TABLEA-1 
Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Budgetary Impact ( 1979-1988) 
Transportation and Communications, Economic Services 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Category 
Fiscal Measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected R2 F 
Deficit Deficit Deficit Revenues (adj) 
Transportation and Communications 
(1) -0.76 0.512 9.4 
(-3.29) 
(2) -1.08 -0.63 0.793 16.3 
(-6.01) (-3.24) 
(3) -0.20 -0.92 0.795 16.4 
(-1.25) (-6.01) 
(4) -0.63 0.41 0.894 34.7 
(-4.95) (3.03) 
(5) -0.57 0.61 0.919 46.2 
(-5.94) (6.14) 
Economic Service 
(6) -0.80 0.554 10.9 
(-3.64) 
(7) -1.09 -0.60 0.811 18.1 
(-6.36) (-3.24) 
(8) -0.17 -0.92 0.813 18.2 
(-1.12) (-6.36) 
(9) -0.69 0.35 0.887 32.4 
(-5.09) (2.48) 
(10) -0.61 0.56 0.901 37.5 
(-5.67) (5.08) 
Notes: Equations estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for serial 
correlation; R2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of determination; F is 
the F-statistic; ( ) is the t-statistic of significance. All variables are defined in terms of their 
percentage of total (actual) government expenditures. The unexpected deficit is the difference 
between the actual deficit and that projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected 
expenditures are those projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as 
expenditures minus revenues. Positive numbers therefore signify that a larger deficit increases 
budgetary shares. 
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Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Budgetary Impact ( 1979-1988) 
Infrastructure, Municipal Services 
TABLEA-2 













































































Notes: Equations estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for serial 
correlation; R2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of determination; Fis 
the F-statistic; ( ) is the t-statistic of significance. All variables are defined in terms of their 
percentage of total (actual) government expenditures. The unexpected deficit is the difference 
between the actual deficit and that projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected 
expenditures are those projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as 
expenditures minus revenues. Positive numbers therefore signify that a larger deficit increases 
budgetary shares. 
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TABLEA-3 
Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Budgetary Impact ( 1979-1988) 
Human Resource Development, Health and Social Development 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Category 
Fiscal Measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected R2 F 
Deficit Deficit Deficit Revenues (adj) 
Human Resource Development 
(1) 0.74 0.732 22.9 
(3.81) 
(2) 0.99 0.36 0.805 17.5 
(4.88) (1.92) 
(3) -0.02 0.85 0.805 17.5 
(-0.12) (4.88) 
(4) 1.00 0.27 0.866 26.9 
(6.02) (1.66) 
(5) 0.72 -0.08 0.697 10.2 
(3.40) (-0.40) 
Health and Social Development 
(6) 0.67 0.495 8.8 
(2.55) 
(7) 0.74 0.11 0.501 3.9 
(2.15) (0.35) 
(8) -0.17 0.63 0.433 3.9 
(-0.63) (2.17) 
(9) 1.03 0.60 0.707 10.6 
(4.28) (2.58) 
(10) 0.72 0.24 0.480 4.7 
(2.63) (0.90) 
Notes: Equations estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for serial 
correlation; R2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of determination; Fis 
the F-statistic; ( ) is the t-statistic of significance. All variables are defined in terms of their 
percentage of total (actual) government expeµditures. The unexpected deficit is the difference 
between the actual deficit and that projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected 
expenditures are those projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as 
expenditures minus revenues. Positive numbers therefore signify that a larger deficit increases 
budgetary shares. 
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TABLEA-4 
Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Budgetary Impact ( 1979-1988) 
Defense, Government Lending 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Category 
Fiscal Measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected R2 F 
Deficit Deficit Deficit Revenues (adj) 
Defense 
(1) 0.45 0.166 2.6 
(1.35) 
(2) 0.24 -0.33 0.171 1.6 
(0.59) (-083) 
(3) -0.42 0.20 0.127 1.7 
(-1.28) (0.59) 
(4) 0.90 1.00 0.761 13.7 
(4.23) (4.72) 
(5) 0.64 0.67 0.569 6.3 
(2.58) (2.75) 
Government Lending 
(6) -0.59 0.221 3.3 
(-2.18) 
(7) -0.92 -0.77 0.679 9.5 
(-4.88) (-3.34) 
(8) -0.41 -0.78 0.681 9.6 
(-2.03) (-4.88) 
(9) -0.40 0.55 0.789 16.0 
(-2.76) (3.22) 
(10) -0.36 0.67 0.782 15.3 
(-2.75) (4.68) 
Notes: Equations estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for serial 
correlation; R2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of determination; Fis 
the F-statistic; ( ) is the t-statistic of significance. All variables are defined in terms of their 
percentage of total (actual) government expenditures. The unexpected deficit is the difference 
between the actual deficit and that projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected 
expenditures are those projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as 
expenditures minus revenues. Positive numbers therefore signify that a larger deficit increases 
budgetary shares. 
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TABLEA-5 
Saudi Arabia: Fiscal Budgetary Impact ( 1979-1988) 
Administration, Subsidies 
(standardized regression coefficients) 
Category 
Fiscal Measure Statistics 
Unexpected Expected Actual Expected R2 F 
Deficit Deficit Deficit Revenues (adj) 
Administration 
(1) 0.37 0.530 10.0 
(1.82) 
(2) 0.26 -0.24 0.506 5.1 
(1.08) (-0.86) 
(3) -0.34 0.22 0.507 5.2 
(-1.36) (1.08) 
(4) 0.59 0.55 0.688 9.8 
(3.07) (2.51) 
(5) 0.49 0.34 0.624 7.7 
(2.54) (1.66) 
Subsidies 
(6) 0.05 0.634 15.4 
0.22 
(7) -0.06 -0.09 0.591 6.8 
(-0.15) (-0.32) 
(8) -0.06 -0.05 0.597 6.8 
(-0.04) (-0.02) 
(9) 0.10 0.33 0.693 10.0 
(0.32) (1.48) 
(10) -0.06 0.32 0.692 10.0 
(-0.28) (1.57) 
Notes: Equations estimated with a Cochraine-Orcutt iterative procedure to correct for serial 
correlation; R2 (adj) is the adjusted (for degrees of freedom) coefficient of determination; F is 
the F-statistic; ( ) is the t-statistic of significance. All variables are defined in terms of their 
percentage of total (actual) government expenditures. The unexpected deficit is the difference 
between the actual deficit and that projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. Expected 
expenditures are those projected at the beginning of the fiscal year. The deficit is defined as 
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